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The last decade cognitive neuroscience has seen a growing interest in an embodied 
view of cognition, according to which higher-level cognition is supported by basic 
sensory-motor structures. However, the embodied view of cognition has not gone 
unchallenged and has been criticized on both methodological and philosophical 
grounds. In addition, researchers from within the field differ in their views, ranging 
from strong claims about embodied processes as a necessary prerequisite for 
thinking to weaker claims about embodiment as merely accompanying higher-order 
cognitive processes. Crucial questions that remain unanswered include: “How 
conclusive is the support for strong or weak claims of embodied cognition?”, “How 
does an embodied view of cognition account for higher-order abstract thinking?” 
and “How do we represent concepts that we have never experienced ourselves?”. 
This workshop aims to shed light on these issues by getting together empirical 
researchers of embodied cognition from different backgrounds.  
 
Deadline for poster submissions: 4 July 2010 
 
Invited Speakers 
• Alfonso Caramazza, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA and Center for 
Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Italy  
• Pierre Jacob, Institut Nicod, Paris, France  
• Alex Martin, National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), Bethesda, USA  
• Rolf Zwaan, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands  
• Tania Singer, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive & Brain Sciences, Leipzig, 
Germany  
• Harold Bekkering, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition & Behaviour, Nijmegen, 
The Netherlands 
 
Visit the website for more information 
http://embodiedmind.cognitive-psychology.eu/ 
